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Abstract 
In this paper, we empirically analyse redistributive efficiency of fiscal policy -instruments 
and their degree of decentralisation- and its determinants for a sample of thirty-five 
developed and developing countries over the 2000-2016 period. To do this, a two-stage 
procedure is followed. First, we estimate the redistributive efficiency of fiscal policy -
taking into account size and decentralisation degree of cash transfers and direct taxes- by 
employing a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method. We obtain evidence that 
efficiency varies across countries and -on average- has diminished over time. Yet, fiscal 
decentralisation might not play a role in efficiency. Second, a truncated regression 
analysis is used to identify the potential factors that might explain redistribution 
efficiency variation across countries and time. Our results show that efficiency is 
associated with having a non-federal political system, high government effectiveness and 
democratic accountability, low education inequality and the existence of debt fiscal rules. 
Key words: Redistributive efficiency, fiscal policy, decentralisation, DEA, truncated 
regression analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Income distribution has become one of the most relevant topics in current economic 
literature (Piketty and Saez 2006; Gasparini and Lustig 2011; Piketty 2014; Alvaredo et 
al. 2018). Indeed, the attention has been focussed on the shaping inequality as a 
consequence of the expansion of finances -including wealth-, globalisation and skill-
biased technological change (Franzini and Pianta 2015).  
While inequality in market income (i.e., before transfers and direct taxes) sharply 
increased in the world during the 1980s and most of the 1990s, a downward trend has 
been observed in inequality since the early 2000s. This is a result of an inequality gap 
reduction between developed economies and the rest of the world, in particular as a 
consequence of the decrease of inequality in China and India, and the increase of 
inequality in many advanced economies (OECD 2015; IMF 2017). Additionally, the data 
has shown that inequality in disposable income (i.e., after transfers and direct taxes) has 
also increased in many advanced economies over the last twenty-five years (Caminada et 
al. 2019). Specifically, Caminada et al. (2019) emphasise the fact that income 
redistribution has weakened or stagnated in the aftermath of the Great Recession because 
governments have been focused on restoring public finances; and, adjustment programs 
frequently hurt the most vulnerable groups in society (Gasparini and Lustig 2011).  
This is important because the increase in income inequality could be harmful to 
economic growth and development since it creates social pressures for fiscal 
redistribution, which may undermine and divert public resources from productive 
activities (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Halter et al. 2014; Berg et al. 2018). 
Against this background, one of the main driving forces behind the differences in 
inequality reduction across countries groups is attributed to asymmetries in the role 
played by the redistributive fiscal policies (Brandolini and Smeeding 2007; Wang et al. 
2014). While developed economies have shown a strong fiscal redistributive policy 
through transfers and taxes, in developing countries this is very limited since they tend to 
have fewer fiscal resources available to affect redistribution (Goñi et al. 2011; Villela et 
al. 2007). 
 Thus, an efficient use of the fiscal resources (transfers and direct taxes) might 
contribute to achieving a greater level of income redistribution. However, not often in the 
literature is it discussed how efficiently the instruments of fiscal policy could improve 
income redistribution. That is, to reach a given level of redistribution at lower levels of 
transfers and direct taxes or to reach more redistribution at given transfers and direct taxes 
levels. Moreover, another strand of the literature (see, for example, Sepulveda and 
Martinez-Vazquez 2011) indicates that the size of fiscal resources as well as their 
decentralisation is relevant in affecting income distribution. Yet, the link between 
redistribution and decentralisation has rarely been discussed in the literature. Thus, the 
central question we want to examine is how redistributively efficient has been the fiscal 
policy -instruments and their degree of decentralisation- across countries and over time? 
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Our purpose in this research is to empirically analyse in depth the redistributive 
efficiency of government resources and decentralisation degree of public social cash 
transfers (henceforth transfers) and direct taxation for a sample of thirty-five developed 
and developing countries over 2000-2016. The study focuses on two main instruments 
that involve transfers and direct taxes because these policies may have a relevant 
redistributive impact; in particular, transfers are relevant for the most income vulnerable 
groups in a society and income taxes are mainly paid by the rich (Wang et al. 2012; 
Caminada et al. 2019).  
Furthermore, given that this study considers a cross-country perspective, naturally 
we also expect to find that redistribution efficiency performance differs across countries 
and over time due to several determinants, such as demographic, economic, political and 
institutional factors (Mahler and Jesuit 2006). Thus, an additional relevant question we 
want to deal with is which are the forces that underlie achieving redistribution efficiency 
objectives? Specifically, our interest here centres on knowing the role of a federal political 
system on redistributive efficiency of fiscal policy. 
This aim will be tackled by using a two-stage approach (Simar and Wilson 2007, 
2011). In the first stage, we use a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) bootstrapping 
technique to empirically evaluate the redistributive efficiency of fiscal policy instruments 
and their degree of decentralisation (of transfers and direct taxes) comparing between 
countries. By employing this, an efficiency score is obtained for each country (and also a 
country efficiency ranking), which arises from comparing the individual redistributive 
performance of each country with respect to the best possible redistributive performance 
in the sample of countries. In the second stage, we examine the potential exogenous or 
non-discretional determinants of redistribution efficiency variation across countries and 
over time by applying bootstrap truncated panel regression analysis. The focus of this 
second stage is the identification of the possible sources of (in)efficiency. Understanding 
this variation is crucial for identifying potential policy options to improve redistribution 
and thus reduced income inequality.  
This paper contributes to redistribution and fiscal policy empirical literature in three 
ways. First, we provide empirical evidence on the redistributive efficiency of fiscal policy 
instruments and decentralisation (of transfers and direct taxes) for a panel of developed 
and developing countries. To our knowledge, such an efficiency analysis has not been 
applied before considering fiscal instruments and their degree of decentralisation to 
compute efficiency scores and countries’ efficiency ranking. This is one of the main 
novelties of this paper. Secondly, we provide new insight into the income distribution 
literature about the redistributive impact of the Great Recession. Our empirical results 
reveal that efficiency varies across countries and -on average- has diminished over time. 
This fact highlights the need for policies that can counter this decline. Thirdly, we explore 
in depth the underlying determinants of efficiency differences across countries and over 
time. Our article naturally complements previous works in this redistribution field 
covering different explanatory factors. While some previous findings of the empirical 
literature of redistributive efficiency are confirmed (e.g., is directly associated with high 
government effectiveness and low education inequality), some new results are also 
obtained that it is straightforwardly associated with having a non-federal (or unitary) 
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political system, high democratic accountability as well as the existence of debt fiscal 
rules. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a 
descriptive analysis of the macroeconomics relationships between income redistribution 
and fiscal policies. Section 3 reviews the related literature. Data is detailed in Section 4, 
while the empirical strategy is presented in Section 5. Section 6 presents the empirical 
results and robustness tests. Section 7 concludes.  
 
 
2. Income redistribution and fiscal policy: A brief overview 
 
Income distribution is considered unequal in all countries of the world (and between 
them), hence, for the purpose of promoting economic equity it is important how 
government affects redistribution though the instrument of fiscal policy (Brandolini and 
Smeeding 2007; Guillaud et al. 2019). Inequality can be analysed using different 
approaches, although the most standard metric is income. Income inequality among 
households is typically measured by the Gini index, which takes values from 0 to 100; a 
value of 0 represents perfect equality and a value of 100 extreme inequality among 
households.  
According to the IMF (2017), fiscal policy design could have an important 
redistributive effect on reducing income inequality -Gini index- by three channels. First, 
it can reduce inequality in market income via government transfers and progressive direct 
taxes. Second, it can reduce inequality in disposable income through subsidies and 
indirect taxes (or consumption taxes). Finally, it can reduce inequality in market income 
through in-kind transfers (e.g., education and health). Our proposed analysis is concerned 
with the first channel, which represents direct government redistribution. 
One of the most prominent features of all regions of countries around the world is 
their high and persistent levels of income inequality, described by the Gini market index 
in Figure 1. The evidence suggests that Africa and Latin America are the regions with the 
most unequal income distribution in the world (see, for instance, Gasparini and Lustig 
2011). We focus on the change in income distribution from inequality in market income 
-Gini market- to inequality in disposable income -Gini net-; this is the redistributive effect 
of transfers and direct taxes. As Figure 1 illustrates, from the Gini market index (left bar) 
to the Gini net index (right bar), the redistributive effect of transfers and direct taxes differ 
considerably across regions and over time. They play a major role in the reduction of 
market income inequality in advanced economies –this group shows the highest level of 
absolute redistribution. Yet, the trend of inequality in disposable income is upward in 
advanced economies while in the other regions it declines. Overall, the effectiveness of 
fiscal redistribution to reduce inequality has remained relatively steady over time. 
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Figure 1 – Market and net income Gini indices around the world 
(mean five-year period 1990-2016) 
 
Note: The left bar represents the Gini market index (dark colour) and the right bar represents the Gini net 
index (light colour).  
Source: Own elaboration base on Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). 
 
Figure 2 compares the market and net Gini indices for the sample of countries 
(panel -a- by regions and panel -b- by countries) considered in this study from 2000 to 
2016; countries are listed in order of their absolute redistribution level from largest to 
smallest. The plots show important differences between developed countries for the two 
types of Gini indices and between them and developing countries. While the policy of 
transfers and direct taxes in Eastern Europe (EE) (e.g., Hungary and the Czech Republic), 
Western Europe (WE) (e.g., Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, and so on) and North 
Europe (NE) (e.g., Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and so on) economies seem to be more 
effective in reducing market income disparities -the absolute redistribution of these 
regions is 19.6, 19.2 and 18.5 points, respectively-, in Southern Europe (SE) (e.g., Italy, 
Spain, and so on) -the absolute redistribution in the region is 16.4 points- and other 
developed countries (ODC) (e.g., the United States and Israel) -ODC absolute 
redistribution is 13.9 points- are shown less effective. The policy appears irrelevant to 
reduce market income inequality disparities in developing countries (DC) (e.g., South 
Africa, Chile, Peru and El Salvador) -the absolute redistribution is 5.0 points-. Therefore, 
there are important opportunities for the redistributive government policies to affect 
income distribution. 
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Figure 2 – Market and net income Gini indices in the sample of countries 
(mean period 2000-2016) 
 
Panel (a): By regions 
 
 
Panel (b): By countries 
 
Note: Gini market index is computing on market income and Gini net index is compute on disposable 
income (disposable income = market income + transfers – direct taxes). For a complete description of the 
regions, see Table A.1 in the Appendix. Regions and countries are listed in order of their absolute 
redistribution level from largest to smallest. 
Source: Own elaboration base on Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID). 
 
Nevertheless, the absolute redistribution measure does not consider the initial 
market income disparities between countries. For instance, the market Gini of Iceland, 
Slovenia, Slovakia and Switzerland is about 40 points, below that of other developed and 
developing economies in the sample; in other words, they are initially more equal 
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societies. Consequently, a fiscal policy that achieves a similar reduction in inequality in 
market income (i.e., absolute redistribution) in two countries (e.g., Iceland and the United 
States), does not mean that they are equally redistributively effective, it going to be more 
effective in a country that presents lower initial inequality. This is the relative 
redistribution measure that takes into account cross-country differences in the initial level 
of inequality in market income. To sum, our aim is to identify where the redistributive 
efficiency comes from. The methodology proposed in this study allows us to advance in 
this direction (see Section 5). 
 
 
3. Background 
 
In recent decades, there has been increased interest and demand among citizens about the 
efficient use of public resources and the quality of the fiscal policies of governments 
(Afonso et al. 2010a; Christl et al. 2020). Several scholars have studied public sector 
efficiency and its determinants (Afonso et al. 2005; Afonso et al. 2010b; Afonso et al. 
2013; Christl et al. 2020) and find significant inefficiency in many countries. For instance, 
Afonso et al. (2005), using a Free Disposal Hull (FDH) analysis, find for twenty-three 
OECD member states that, on average, countries with a “small” public sector report the 
highest public sector performance. Afonso et al. (2010b), employing a DEA method and 
Tobit regression analysis, obtain for “new” European Union member states and some 
emerging markets that public expenditure efficiency is rather diverse across them. They 
also find that higher income, a competent civil service, high education levels and the 
security of property rights tend to prevent inefficiencies in the public sector. Afonso et al. 
(2013), using a DEA and Tobit regression methods, examine twenty-three Latin 
American countries covering 2001-2010. They find that government size is inversely 
correlated with public sector efficiency while transparency, regulatory quality and control 
of corruption are directly correlated with it. Recently Christl et al. (2020), using FDH and 
order-m efficiency techniques, study twenty-three European countries during 1995-2015, 
and find that decentralisation positively affects public sector efficiency while fiscal rules 
do not affect it. 
The vast majority of the public sector efficiency literature has focussed on analysis 
of education and health services across countries –most of them using DEA and 
regression analysis techniques (Gupta and Verhoeven 2001; Afonso and Aubyn 2005; 
Hauner and Kyobe 2010; Afonso and Aubyn 2011; Adam et al. 2014). For both services, 
the most resounding conclusion is that high government spending in terms of GDP tends 
to be associated with low efficiency. This is found, for instance, by: Gupta and Verhoeven 
(2001) for thirty-seven countries in Africa from 1894 to 1995; Afonso and Aubyn (2005) 
in OECD countries for 2000; Afonso and Aubyn (2011) examine only health services 
efficiency in OECD in the whole 2000-2003 period; Hauner and Kyobe (2010) for a large 
panel of economies from 1980 to 2004; Adam et al. (2014) for twenty-one OECD 
countries during 1970-2000; among others. 
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Another strand of literature studies income distribution across countries, examining 
the effects of transfers and direct taxes systems on income redistribution and their 
effectiveness on inequality reduction; in particular, in developed countries (Korpi and 
Palme 1998; Brandolini and Smeeding 2007). Regarding this, the evidence from OECD 
countries shows that the bulk of the fiscal redistributive impact is due to the effect of 
public transfers (Wang et al. 2014; Jesuit and Mahler 2017). However, Adema et al. 
(2014) point out that similar levels of government spending in OECD countries have not 
affected redistribution to the same extent. In relation to developing countries, Villela et 
al. (2007) and Goñi et al. (2011) attribute poor redistributive performance of fiscal policy 
in Latin American countries to lower tax revenue raising capacity, which limited the 
available resource to increase the size of transfers. 
A priori, we could use various combinations of instruments of fiscal policy to 
generate the same redistributive level. However, the distributional impacts of fiscal policy 
may vary depending on the expenditure structure and specific taxes across countries. With 
regard to this, several empirical studies (see, for example, Wang et al. 2012; Joumard et 
al. 2013; Caminada et al. 2017; Causa and Hermansen 2017; Caminada et al. 2019) 
indicate a greater redistributive impact of transfers than taxes.1 From these studies, we 
observe that the fiscal redistributive impact is between 25% and 35% on reducing 
inequality in market income; while social transfers account for 67%-84% of total 
redistribution, the taxes only account for 16%-33%. However, other studies (Guillaud 
et al. 2019; Avram et al. 2014) for developed countries show that if pensions are 
classified as market income rather than transfers, redistribution from taxes is greater 
than that from transfers. 
Most of these studies have concluded that the impact of redistributive fiscal 
policy is strongly associated with the budget size and less so with the extent to which 
they are targeted to low-income groups, e.g., the efficiency of the tax system 
progressivity (see, for instance, Korpi and Palme 1998 and Mahler and Jesuit 2006). 
Indeed, these results do not exclusively concern developed countries; similar conclusions 
are reported for Latin American countries (Goñi et al. 2011).  
In this vein, other scholars have investigated the determinants of the redistributive 
fiscal policy across countries and over time –most of them show a weak performance and 
heterogeneity of expenditures and taxes to affect redistribution (Afonso et al. 2010b; 
Kyriacou et al. 2018). For instance, Afonso et al. (2010b) focus on the efficiency of fiscal 
policy with respect to income distribution for OECD countries in the 1995-2000 period 
using a DEA and a Tobit regression method. Kyriacou et al. (2018) study the impact of 
fiscal policy on redistributive efficiency for OECD countries from 1995 to 2010 using a 
DEA and a bootstrap truncated regression. Both analyses provide evidence that high 
quality of institutions is associated with more redistributive efficiency. Apart from that, 
                                               
1 These studies are based on the micro-household income data from Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), 
which is a harmonised version of national household income surveys –using a budget incidence approach; 
excluding Joumard et al. (2013) that use the OECD Income Distribution and Poverty Database. LIS data 
set is very useful to explain the variation in levels of redistribution in a cross-country comparison; however, 
many times restrict the exploration of the determinants of redistribution in a temporal dimension because 
data are collected at irregular time points (in waves) and vary across countries (Solt 2015). 
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many studies (e.g., Bradley et al. 2003; Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005; Huber and 
Stephens 2014) report that the most important determinant of redistribution is welfare 
state generosity. 
 
The effect of fiscal decentralisation on income redistribution 
 
The seminal literature of decentralisation (Tiebout 1956; Oates 1972; among others) 
underlies on the “decentralisation theorem” of Oates (1972). Assuming the government 
as a benevolent agent, Oates argues that subnational governments are superior to the 
central government to adapt policies to specific local preferences and needs –given the 
information advantages, resulting in an improvement of government performance and 
well-being of society. Also, this theory indicates that certain functions, such as income 
redistribution, should be under the central government provision. A basic reason indicates 
that a strong redistributive policy to support low-income groups enhanced by a specific 
jurisdiction may induce an influx of the poor from other jurisdictions and encourage an 
exodus of taxpayers (high-income) groups to other jurisdictions (Oates 1999). Yet, a new 
generation of literature indicates that the presence of externalities, such as imperfect 
information, economies of scale and selfish officials (e.g., political rent-seeking), has 
undermined the normative “decentralisation theorem” (Oates 2005). 
In this article, naturally, the key questions are whether fiscal decentralisation might 
influence income redistribution, and which are the possible channels of transmission of 
it. In this sense, several scholars point to a positive effect of decentralisation on various 
measures of governance (Christl et al. 2020; Besley and Smart 2007) and income 
inequality (Neyapti 2006; Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez 2011).2  
Along this line, some authors indicate that a certain degree of decentralisation 
increase efficiency by greater electoral control and yardstick competition among 
competing jurisdictions (Adam et al. 2014). For instance, Christl et al. (2020) indicate 
that revenue decentralisation increases information about the preferences and needs of 
the communities and accountability which disincentivizes overspending of subnational 
governments and thus improves public sector efficiency. Pauly (1973) indicates that 
redistribution may be a local public good and so decentralisation may increase it. Besley 
and Smart (2007) ague that decentralisation enhances the public interest to compare the 
public services and taxes across their jurisdictions contributing to a reduction in the “bad” 
use of the resources by politicians. Additionally, inter-jurisdictional competition might 
be observed in terms of the provision of public goods and services and taxation in order 
to keep their tax bases or attract new taxpayers from other jurisdictions (Sepulveda and 
Martinez-Vazquez 2011). However, decentralisation can negatively affect public sector 
efficiency due to higher average costs of producing public goods and services, consequent 
to the effect of economies of scale (see, for instance, Adam et al. 2014 who refer to an 
inverted U-shaped between decentralisation and public sector efficiency). Moreover, 
                                               
2 See, for instance, Martinez‐Vazquez et al. (2017) for a survey of the impact of fiscal decentralisation on 
the economy, society and politics; also, for a discussion of decentralisation measurement and endogeneity 
issues.  
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Treisman (2000) indicates that federal states are more corrupt than unitary one because 
autonomous subnational governments competition for private business gains at the 
national level lead to bribes for the appropriation of it. 
Besides, Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez (2011) study thirty-four developing 
countries and twenty-two developed countries between 1971 and 2000 and show that 
fiscal decentralisation reduces income inequality only if the size of the public sector in 
the overall economy is relatively large (twenty percent or more). They argue that, for 
affecting income distribution, both the type of redistributive programs that could be 
implemented at the subnational government level and the size of public resources 
available for redistributive aims from central government to subnational governments are 
relevant. Indeed, distribution of disposable income might be altered by expenditure and 
revenue decentralisation because it could affect the composition of public spending 
modifying income inequality (e.g., direct income transfers to individuals as part of the 
redistributive policy objectives) and it could impact the progressivity of the income tax 
schedule (e.g., implement a progressive or regressive tax system). Additionally, Neyapti 
(2006) indicates that revenue decentralisation may reduce income inequality but only in 
cases of good governance. Naturally, transfers and taxation of subnational governments 
cannot necessarily be focused on these redistributive aims (Sepulveda and Martinez-
Vazquez 2011). 
In sum, our starting point is that not only do transfers and direct taxes shares affect 
redistribution but also it is important to account for fiscal decentralisation. We find some 
authors (Adam et al. 2014; Christl et al. 2020) who account for fiscal decentralisation as 
an explanatory variable in their regression analysis to explain public sector efficiency. To 
our knowledge, however, such an analysis of redistributive efficiency of fiscal policy has 
not been applied before by considering decentralisation to compute efficiency. Our work 
aims to fill this gap. Additionally, using the previous literature and their results, we can 
also identify some further factors that may possibly affect efficiency that have not yet 
been explored in the redistribution literature, such as federal political system. 
 
 
4. Data 
 
To analyse redistributive efficiency of fiscal policy instruments and their degree of 
decentralisation -of transfers and direct taxes-, a panel of 35 countries is used during the 
2000-2016 period. This panel is composed of 31 developed economies and 4 developing 
economies (see Table A.1 of Appendix). The four periods examined are 2000-2004, 
2005-2009, 2010-2014 and 2015-2016; this is, the observations for each country are 
arranged in five-year averages and the last one arranged in two-year averages; this is due 
to redistribution moves very slowly over time and we are interested in capture long-term 
trends and structural changes, i.e., we neutralise the business cycle effect (see, for 
instance, Afonso et al. 2005 and Sepulveda and Martinez-Vazquez 2011). The specific 
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countries and period considered cover most available data; in particular, the inclusion of 
developing countries in the analysis is limited by the lack of a decentralisation dataset. 
The fiscal policy variables used in this analysis are transfers (public social cash 
transfers spending) and direct taxes, both at the central government (CG) level and at the 
subnational government (SNG) level. The transfers categories include social security 
benefits, welfare benefits and social benefits related to employment (for example, the 
unemployment insurance); they are obtained from International Financial Statistics of the 
International Monetary Fund database (IFS-IMF) and Social Expenditure Database 
(SOCX) from OECD statistics. Direct taxes include income taxes profits and capital 
gains, social security contributions, payroll taxes and property taxes; data are obtained 
from the revenues statistics database of OCDE. Transfers and direct taxes data are 
obtained at general government level in terms of GDP, annual data frequency.  
In the empirical literature, fiscal decentralisation has traditionally been measured 
as the share of revenues and expenditures of SNGs over total revenues and expenditures 
of the general government (GG) and computed with data from the Government Financial 
Statistics of the IMF (see, for example, Adam et al. 2014; Canavire-Bacarreza et al. 2016; 
Martinez‐Vazquez et al. 2017). Since 2018, the decentralisation dataset is summarized in 
the Fiscal Decentralisation dataset from the IMF, which covers seventy-five countries and 
covers 1972-2018, annual data frequency. Specifically, the Fiscal Decentralisation 
dataset contains information on transfers and direct taxes that the GG has transferred to 
SNGs (state, provincial, regional, and local governments, including districts and 
municipalities), and transfers and direct taxes decentralisation is expressed as a ratio of 
transfers and direct taxes of SNG level as a proportion of the GG level (Lledó et al. 2018).3 
Thus, we employ this information to obtain transfers and direct taxes at CG and SNG 
levels (as percentage of GDP). Note that our decentralisation variable does not concern 
political decentralisation (degree of decentralisation of elections) or administrative 
decentralisation (degree of sub-division of nation states) (Sepulveda and Martinez-
Vazquez 2011). In other words, high tax and expenditure decentralisation do not 
necessarily involve high subnational autonomy power (Kyriacou and Roca-Sagalés 2011, 
2020). 
In this study we propose to use two redistribution measures. The first is obtained as 
the difference between the Gini market index (before transfers and direct taxes) and the 
Gini net index (after transfers and direct taxes), called absolute redistribution. The second 
measure is calculated as the difference between the Gini market index and Gini net index 
divided by the Gini market index, called relative redistribution. These measure are 
extensively used by several authors  (Korpi and Palme 1998; Bradley et al. 2003; Mahler 
and Jesuit 2006; Huber and Stephens 2014). The Standardized World Income Inequality 
Database (SWIID) developed by Solt (2019) provides information on the Gini indices 
and is available for 196 countries from 1960 to the present, annual data frequency; it also 
includes information on the measure of absolute and relative redistribution.4 
                                               
3 Figure A.1 in the Appendix illustrates the fiscal decentralisation in our sample of countries, showing that 
countries are characterised as having more decentralised direct taxes than transfers.  
4 See Solt (2019) for a complete description of the SWIID; we employ version 8.1 (update in May 2019). 
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We examine a wide range of variables, based on previous work, that capture 
demographic, economic, political and institutional factors to identify the potential 
determinants of the variation of redistributive efficiency between countries and over time. 
Variables are obtained through the exploration of various data sources (see Tables A.2 of 
Appendix). Specifically, we focus on the role of a federal political system, as a proxy of 
political decentralisation, on redistributive efficiency of fiscal policy. 
Thus, we introduce the variable “federalism” from Gerring and Thacker (2004) that 
involves two components: territorial government and bicameralism. On the one hand, 
territorial government refers to a political system where the national government is or is 
not sovereign relative to its territorial units, namely, unitary and federal states 
respectively. On the other hand, bicameralism refers to the relative power between the 
lower and upper houses (i.e., share of policy-making power between two chambers) at 
the national level. Consequently, a federal state is characterised by federal territorial 
government and strong bicameralism (i.e., upper house has some effective veto power); 
in this case, the “federalism” variable takes the highest value. In a fully federal state, 
territorial units have constitutional recognition of subnational authority, independently 
elected territorial legislature, specific policy purviews reserved to them, and revenue-
raising authority.  
 
 
5. Empirical strategy 
 
The aim of this section is to present the empirical strategy proposed for measuring the 
redistributive efficiency of the government resources and decentralisation (of transfers 
and direct taxes), and then, analyse the factors that might explain how efficiency varies 
across countries and over time. 
To undertake this analysis, a two-stage methodology is proposed (Simar and Wilson 
2007, 2011). First, we use a bootstrap-DEA to empirically evaluate the effect of fiscal 
policy instruments and their degree of decentralisation on redistributive efficiency. 
Second, we examine the possible determinants of redistribution efficiency heterogeneity 
across countries and over time by using a bootstrap truncated regression analysis (pooling 
the data across the periods). In particular, in this second stage we are interested in 
analysing the role of a federal political system (basically political decentralisation) on 
redistributive efficiency. 
 
5.1 First-stage DEA analysis 
 
DEA is a linear programming (LP) methodology for measuring efficiency by comparing 
each decision making units (DMUs), with an efficient production frontier (Farrell 1957; 
Charnes et al. 1978). DEA uses data on input and output variables to construct a non-
parametric efficiency frontier over the data points solved by the sequence of LP problem–
one data point solution for each DMUs. The DEA analysis methodology can be performed 
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input-oriented or output–oriented. That is, an input-oriented model minimises inputs for 
a given amount of output and an output-oriented model maximises output for a given 
amount of inputs. The result of the LP problem is an efficiency score for each DMUs, 
which makes possible to rank the efficiency of DMUs by comparing each performance 
with the best-practice (or performance) in the sample at period t. This is, the DEA method 
defines the set of observations with the best performance for the DMUs of the analysis 
and produces a frontier of production possibilities by linearly connecting them, under the 
assumption of convex technology; DMUs that are not defining the frontier are considered 
inefficient (Bogetoft and Otto 2011). 
Analytically, suppose there are N inputs and M outputs for each of I DMUs; and for 
the i-th DMU, 𝒙𝑖 is the column vector of the inputs and 𝒚𝑖 is the column vector of the 
outputs. We can define X as the (N x I) input matrix and Y as the (M x I) output matrix. 
The output-oriented efficiency score for the i-th DMU is then estimated via the following 
LP problem (Coelli et al. 2005): 
 
     max
𝜃,𝜆
𝜃𝑖      (1) 
Subject to 
−𝜃𝑖 𝒚𝑖 + 𝒀𝝀 ≥ 0,     (2) 
                              𝒙𝑖 − 𝑿𝝀 ≥ 0,     (3) 
𝑰𝟏´𝝀 = 1,     (4) 
      𝝀 ≥ 0      (5) 
 
where 𝜃𝑖 is the output-oriented efficiency score that measures technical efficiency, i.e., 
the optimal solution to this problem (Equation 1), 1 ≤ 𝜃𝑖 ≤ ∞, and 𝜃𝑖 − 1 is the potential 
proportional increase in the output quantities that could be achieved without altering the 
input quantities by the i-th DMU. If 𝜃𝑖 > 1, the country is within the frontier (i.e., it is 
inefficient), while 𝜃𝑖 = 1 implies that the country is on the efficiency frontier (i.e., 
efficient). 
Equation 2 stands for the “output constraint”, indicating that the weighted sum of 
outputs from all DMUs in the sample must be greater than or equal to the potential output 
for i-th DMU given the “input constraint” shown by Equation 3.  
The vector 𝜆 is a (Ix1) vector of constants that measures the weights used to 
compute the location of an inefficient country if it became efficient. Equation 4 represents 
the “convexity constraint” that accounts for variable returns to scale (VRS) production 
function technology, where 𝑰𝟏 is an Ix1 dimensional vector of ones. Note that the 
convexity constraint essentially ensures that an inefficient DMU is only “benchmarked” 
against DMUs of a similar size. That is, the projected point (for that DMU) on the DEA 
frontier is a convex combination of observed DMUs. Finally, this problem has to be 
solved for each of the i-th DMUs to obtain the i efficiency scores.  
DEA efficiency scores may be influenced by exogenous (or “environmental”) 
factors that potentially downward bias efficiency. To correct it, we compute the 
bootstrapping DEA method (Simar and Wilson 2007, 2011; Bogetoft and Otto 2011; Du 
et al. 2018). That is based on the numerical simulation of the original data set and 
 14 
calculating efficiency of the simulated sample through DEA to generate bias-corrected 
efficiency and confidence intervals (Efron 1979; Simar and Wilson 1998, 2000). 
This study will take countries’ DMUs, the income redistribution (two 
specifications, absolute and relative) as the one output variable and transfers and direct 
taxes variables, two each at the CG and SNG levels, as the four input variables. This is, 
we take into account size and decentralisation degree of transfers and direct taxes as 
inputs, which is a novelty.5 Note that fiscal decentralisation is discretionary fiscal policy 
and thus we capture it in the first stage of the DEA analysis (as input). Moreover, we will 
select an output-oriented model (i.e., increase the output given fixed the inputs) because 
the government’s target we assume is redistribution. The measure of technical efficiency 
is calculated as the distance between the observed country and the efficiency frontier, 
which is represented by the best performing countries in the sample. The frontier and 
ranking of efficiency are computed for each sub-period of analysis.  
Moreover, the relationship between output measures and inputs are describe in 
Figure 3. The plots suggest that the countries with higher levels of transfers and direct 
taxes of CG and SNG (i.e., inputs), which include different categories with different 
distributional implications, tend to have greater income redistribution (i.e., outputs) 
during the 2000-2016 period. Specifically, we observe a direct link between the degree 
of fiscal decentralisation (as share of transfers and direct taxes at the SNG level in terms 
of GDP) and redistribution measures. Besides, Figure 3 depicts the fact that countries 
with diverse fiscal resources and decentralisation (e.g., European countries) show 
different redistributive performances. Our methodology approach allows to examine this 
issue. 
                                               
5 See Table A.3 in the Appendix for descriptive statistics of input-output variables. 
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Figure 3 – Relationship between income redistribution measures and fiscal policy 
(mean period 2000-2016) 
 
Panel (a) Absolute redistribution 
 
Panel (a.1): Social transfers              Panel (a.2): Direct taxes 
 
Panel (b) Relative redistribution 
 
Panel (b.1): Social transfers              Panel (b.2): Direct taxes 
 
Note: Denmark is excluded from the plot’s representation between income redistribution measures and 
social transfers at the SNG level for a scale reasons (social transfers at the SNG level are above 10% in 
terms of GDP) but not in the correlation value. The country code and description are detailed in Table A.1 
in the Appendix. (**) is the level of significance 5%. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from SWIID, IFS-IMF and OECD (SOCX) statistics. 
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5.2 Second-stage regression analysis 
 
Once the bootstrap-DEA efficiency scores are obtained in the first stage of the analysis, 
we proceed to the second stage. We regress the efficiency scores on a set of possible 
explanatory factors that might explain differences in the variation of the redistributive 
efficiency across country and over time, and which do not respond to the discretionary 
fiscal policy decisions.  
Thus, we regress the estimated bias-corrected efficiency scores, 𝜃𝑖𝑡, on a set of non-
discretionary (or exogenous) variables, 𝑍𝑖𝑡, that potentially influence the efficiency level. 
Specifically, we consider the following model: 
𝜃𝑖𝑡 = ∝  + 𝑍𝑖𝑡β + 𝑑𝑡 +  𝑑𝑗 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡    (6) 
where 𝑖 = 1, 2, … 𝐼 represents the countries in the sample and 𝑡 = 1, 2, … 𝑇, refers to the 
time period, ∝ is a constant, β a vector of parameters to be estimated that capture the 
effect of the explanatory variables on efficiency scores, 𝑑𝑡 represents period fixed effects, 
𝑑𝑗 represents the time-invariant variables and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is statistical noise, 𝜀𝑖𝑡  ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀
2), with 
left-tail truncation given by 𝜀𝑖𝑡  ≥ 1− ∝  − 𝑍𝑖𝑡β − 𝑑𝑡 − 𝑑𝑗 since DEA efficiency scores 
are larger than or equal to 1 in the output-orientation approach.  
A couple of problems arise since true DEA efficiency scores are unobserved and 
replaced by the previously estimated 𝜃𝑖, which in turn are serially correlated in an 
unknown way. Additionally, the explanatory variables are correlated with the error term 
as input and output variables are correlated with explanatory variables. Therefore, a 
bootstrap procedure is implemented to overcome the correlation problem and obtain 
unbiased coefficients and valid confidence intervals. Thus, following Simar and Wilson 
(2007, 2011) and Du et al. (2018), a double bootstrap method will be used, in which DEA 
scores are bootstrapped in the first stage of the analysis to obtain bias-corrected efficiency 
scores, and then the second stage is performed, consisting of regressing the bias-corrected 
efficiency scores on a set of potential explanatory factors using a bootstrap truncated 
regression.  
 
Specification of the empirical model 
 
We estimate the following empirical model:6 
 
𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑓𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑑𝑟𝑖 +  𝛽5𝑑𝑡𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡     (7) 
 
where i indexes the 35 countries in the cross-section dimension of the sample and t 
denotes the sub-period during 2000-2016. “Efficiency score” is the dependent variable 
pertaining to absolute redistribution or relative redistribution outputs. “Federalism” is the 
key time-invariant variable of interest. X is a vector of time varying control variables, Z 
                                               
6 The definitions and sources of all variables are presented in Table A.2 and descriptive statistics in Table 
A.4, both in the Appendix. 
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is a vector of time-invariant control variables, and 𝜀 an error term. Also, we include region 
and period fixed effects, 𝑑𝑟𝑖 and 𝑑𝑡𝑡 respectively.  
First of all, our specification includes the variable “federalism”. Based on the 
background section, we would expect that countries with high “federalism” (federal and 
bicameral) are less redistributive efficient; because reduce available resources to central 
government and redistribution is principally a national level policy, and; because the 
decentralised political power is more corrupt. 
To evaluate if wealthier economies show a more redistributively efficient fiscal 
policy, we control for “GDP per capita” (in log). Among others, Bradley et al. (2003) 
refer to GDP per capita as a typical measure of economic development in almost all 
studies of income distribution. We would expect that economies with higher real income 
are more productive and developed, therefore, they may possible be more efficient. 
Additionally, by employing GDP per capita we also control for population size, and our 
advance expectation is that a large population may have difficulty in governing 
redistribution (Campante and Do 2007). 
We also control for “elderly people”, the share of the population over 65 years of 
age, in an attempt to account for the pressure of the pension system on redistributive 
efficiency. Note that old-age benefits are (one of) the most important social transfers in 
countries and its effect on redistributive efficiency would we depend on the fiscal policy 
design and implementation of them. Additionally, we also control for “unemployment 
rate” since it affects redistribution via the amount of government resources through 
unemployment subsidies (Huber and Stephens 2014). Again, we expect that the impact 
on redistributive efficiency will depend on the specific unemployment compensation 
scheme. In this sense, Mahler and Jesuit (2006) indicate a positive effect of the elderly 
(weak effect) and unemployment rate (strong effect) on fiscal redistribution but they do 
not examine efficiency. 
We also control for “government effectiveness” used to proxy government quality 
(Kaufmann et al. 2011), which involves attributes such as quality of public and civil 
services, independence from political pressures, policy design and execution and 
government credibility. Kyriacou et al. (2018) provide evidence of a strong positive effect 
of government quality on redistributive efficiency. Therefore, we expect that countries 
with high government effectiveness should be able to achieve more redistribution for a 
given level of government resources and decentralisation. 
Moreover, we control for “ethnic fractionalisation” in attempt to account for the 
possibility that high ethnic heterogeneity in the society makes it difficult to agree about 
what constitutes “good” fiscal policies and therefore the income redistribution needed. 
Our fractionalisation variable is from Alesina et al. (2003) and is higher when there are 
many small groups in the society. We expect a negative effect on redistributive efficiency 
because ethnic fractionalisation may lead to rent-seeking behaviour of multiple interest 
groups, creating an inefficient provision of public good (Easterly and Levine 1997; La 
Porta et al. 1999; Alesina et al. 2003).   
We also control for human capital by including the variable “education inequality” 
from Castelló-Climent and Doménech (2014). The expectation is that lower education 
inequality leads to higher societal demands for a more efficient redistribution.   
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Furthermore, we include a variable from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
called “democratic accountability”. This is an indicator of political stability of the country 
and is computed on the basis of the type of a country’s governance, from altering 
democracies (i.e., high democratic accountability) to autarchies governance. We would 
expect countries with high democratic accountability to show more redistributive 
efficiency. 
Apart from that, in recent decades, the increase in public debt and overspending in 
developed countries led to introducing and strengthening the fiscal rules (such as the 
Fiscal Compact in European Union member states after the Great Recession) with the 
consensus being that they foster fiscal discipline (Heinemann et al. 2018). Fiscal rules are 
laws designed to impose a budgetary constraint to limit countries’ scope on fiscal 
aggregates (Lledó et al. 2017). Nevertheless, the empirical literature is inconclusive about 
the budgetary impact of the fiscal rules on public sector efficiency. A recent work (Christl 
et al. 2020) indicates that fiscal rules are relevant to positively affect public sector 
efficiency particularly in the presence of high fiscal imbalance of SNGs. Thus, we control 
for the existence of “debt fiscal rules” in an attempt to account for the possibility that the 
debt boundary prevents overspending and enforces government to be more efficient in 
using public resources.  
Finally, we account for “geographical region” dummy control variables, which 
allow us to partially account for country-specific effects (Sepulveda and Martinez-
Vazquez 2011). In this sense, Canavire-Bacarreza et al. (2016) claim that more 
geographically diverse countries present more heterogeneous population with different 
preferences and needs for public goods and services provision, which is positively 
associated with higher levels of fiscal decentralisation. In addition, Ligthart and 
Oudheusden (2017) argue that geographical proximity draws countries to adopt policies 
similar to neighbouring countries, such as the kind of decentralisation. Therefore, we 
expect that geographical regions affect redistribution although we do not have any prior 
expectation about the effect on efficiency. 
 
 
6. Results 
 
In this section, we first discuss our main empirical findings of estimates of the 
redistributive efficiency of fiscal policy in a panel of thirty-five countries over 2000-2016. 
Next, we present the regression outcomes to explain the factors that may affect the 
redistributive efficiency scores between countries and over time. And finally, we perform 
several robustness tests for our findings.7 
 
                                               
7 To obtain the DEA efficiency score, we use the “Benchmarking” package (function DEA.boot) in R 
software and the bootstrap truncated regression analysis was performed in STATA. All code is available 
from the authors upon request. 
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6.1. First-stage results 
 
Table 1 and 2 show the efficiency scores and country rankings obtained from estimating 
the bootstrap-DEA output-oriented model (VRS technology) considering four inputs 
(transfers and direct taxes, both at CG and at SNG levels) and one output, absolute and 
relative redistributions respectively, for the four selected periods of analysis (2000-2004, 
2005-2009, 2010-2014 and 2015-2016). Both tables indicate that the efficiency scores, 
on average, increase during the period of analysis, which means that the “average” 
country is becoming more inefficient over time. Accordingly, countries could potentially 
increase their redistributive efficiency without altering transfers and direct taxes 
resources and decentralisation degree. Specifically, the averages efficiency scores suggest 
a range of 12.5%-24.7% in the case of absolute redistribution and a range of 8.6%-22.2% 
in the case of relative redistribution for countries to be deemed efficient. Note that some 
authors (see, for instance, Christl et al. 2020) highlight the fact that countries’ public 
sector efficiency improved in the aftermath of the Great Recession based on the argument 
that despite budget cuts do not cause a reduction in public sector goods and services to 
the same extent. Nevertheless, we are providing evidence that income redistribution (i.e., 
distribution component of the public sector) became more inefficient in many countries 
after the 2009 crisis and this outcome may be because redistribution has weakened or 
stagnated and governments have been focused on restoring public finances (Caminada et 
al. 2019). 
In Table 1, we present the efficiency score outcomes using the absolute 
redistribution measure as an output and find that Sweden (2000-2004), the Czech 
Republic (2005-2009), Iceland (2010-2014) and Belgium (2015-2016) are the most 
efficient in the sample (first rank), being located very close to the efficiency frontier 
(scores close to 1). In contrast, Italy (2000-2014) and Japan (2015-2016) are the least 
efficient. The economic interpretation is as follows: for instance, Belgium has an 
efficiency score of 1.066 in the 2015-2016 period, which means it could increase absolute 
redistribution by 6.6% without altering the transfers and direct taxes resources and their 
degree of decentralisation. On the other side, the efficiency score of Japan is 1.875 in the 
2015-2016 period, therefore, it could increase absolute redistribution in 87.5% without 
altering the transfers and direct taxes levels and their degree of decentralisation, thus, 
there is an important possibility for increasing redistributive efficiency. 
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Table 1 – Absolute redistribution: Efficiency scores and country rankings 
Country 
2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 2015-2016 
Efficiency 
score  
Ranking 
Efficiency 
score 
Ranking 
Efficiency 
score 
Ranking 
Efficiency 
score 
Ranking 
Australia 1.037 3 1.062 9 1.059 3 1.369 29 
Austria 1.130 26 1.159 26 1.192 28 1.193 19 
Belgium 1.054 8 1.049 4 1.068 6 1.066 1 
Canada 1.049 6 1.063 10 1.082 13 1.105 5 
Chile 1.074 18 1.066 11 1.079 11 1.134 17 
Czech Republic 1.049 5 1.037 1 1.064 4 1.129 10 
Denmark 1.067 11 1.080 19 1.087 16 1.133 14 
El Salvador 1.075 22 1.081 21 1.088 18 1.134 16 
Estonia 1.074 17 1.076 15 1.089 19 1.130 11 
Finland 1.075 21 1.109 22 1.096 21 1.084 4 
France 1.145 27 1.259 32 1.266 31 1.270 24 
Germany 1.073 15 1.079 17 1.079 10 1.119 7 
Greece 1.091 24 1.179 30 1.155 25 1.312 26 
Hungary 1.062 10 1.060 8 1.077 8 1.127 8 
Iceland 1.068 12 1.068 12 1.051 1 1.206 20 
Ireland 1.075 19 1.073 14 1.077 9 1.129 9 
Israel 1.047 4 1.140 24 1.259 30 1.864 34 
Italy 1.596 35 1.592 35 1.547 35 1.522 33 
Japan 1.214 30 1.218 31 1.470 34 1.875 35 
Latvia 1.159 28 1.051 6 1.131 22 1.388 30 
Lithuania 1.053 7 1.057 7 1.088 17 1.210 21 
Luxembourg 1.061 9 1.072 13 1.087 15 1.131 12 
Netherlands 1.037 2 1.050 5 1.067 5 1.151 18 
Norway 1.262 32 1.177 29 1.187 27 1.284 25 
Peru 1.073 14 1.078 16 1.087 14 1.133 13 
Poland 1.123 25 1.173 28 1.179 26 1.247 23 
Portugal 1.068 13 1.045 2 1.237 29 1.327 27 
Slovak Republic 1.074 16 1.081 20 1.089 20 1.133 15 
Slovenia 1.289 33 1.437 33 1.405 33 1.449 31 
South Africa 1.075 20 1.079 18 1.081 12 1.111 6 
Spain 1.508 34 1.501 34 1.402 32 1.453 32 
Sweden 1.035 1 1.046 3 1.068 7 1.076 2 
Switzerland 1.241 31 1.129 23 1.056 2 1.077 3 
United Kingdom 1.087 23 1.167 27 1.133 23 1.237 22 
United States 1.170 29 1.156 25 1.138 24 1.338 28 
Average 1.125  1.136  1.152  1.247  
Note: Output-oriented variable returns to scale (VRS) technical efficiency. Efficiency score: = 1 represents 
maximum efficiency and > 1 means greater inefficiency. All results are based on one output (absolute 
redistribution) and four inputs (transfers and direct taxes at CG level and at SNG level). Estimation method: 
DEA bootstrap with 10,000 repetition. 
Source: Own estimations. 
 
Table 2 reports the efficiency scores employing the relative redistribution measure 
as an output. This is, we account for initial income inequality conditions in calculating 
the redistributive measure. In other words, we account for the proportional change of the 
redistribution. 
The most relevant finding is that Belgium is the most efficient in the sample 
regardless of the sub-period examined (ranks first). Additionally, other countries that 
show good performance are Finland, Hungary, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway and 
Sweden throughout the 2000-2016 period. During this timeframe, Italy (2000-2014) and 
Israel (2015-2016) are the least efficient. Other countries that present low redistributive 
efficiency include Greece, Japan, Portugal, South Africa, Spain and United States in the 
period 2000-2016. The economic intuition is as above, for instance, Belgium has an 
efficiency score of 1.042 in the 2015-2016 period, that means it could increase relative 
redistribution by 4.2% without changing the transfers and direct taxes resources and their 
degree of decentralisation.
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Table 2 – Relative redistribution: Efficiency scores and country rankings 
Country 
2000-2004 2005-2009 2010-2014 2015-2016 
Efficiency 
score 
Ranking 
Efficiency 
score 
Ranking 
Efficiency 
score 
Ranking 
Efficiency 
score 
Ranking 
Australia 1.095 29 1.058 12 1.044 3 1.310 27 
Austria 1.084 26 1.071 23 1.127 22 1.130 19 
Belgium 1.022 1 1.023 1 1.033 1 1.042 1 
Canada 1.037 7 1.053 10 1.082 14 1.102 7 
Chile 1.051 17 1.053 11 1.055 4 1.123 16 
Czech Republic 1.039 9 1.050 7 1.077 11 1.123 12 
Denmark 1.051 15 1.065 19 1.084 18 1.123 14 
El Salvador 1.053 22 1.065 21 1.084 19 1.124 17 
Estonia 1.052 20 1.065 18 1.085 21 1.123 15 
Finland 1.025 2 1.040 3 1.034 2 1.043 2 
France 1.095 30 1.183 30 1.216 28 1.222 23 
Germany 1.051 14 1.062 15 1.073 8 1.099 5 
Greece 1.070 24 1.263 33 1.242 29 1.311 28 
Hungary 1.035 5 1.041 4 1.068 7 1.101 6 
Iceland 1.050 13 1.064 16 1.083 17 1.109 8 
Ireland 1.052 18 1.059 14 1.073 9 1.119 11 
Israel 1.139 31 1.182 29 1.247 30 1.734 35 
Italy 1.523 35 1.530 35 1.528 35 1.507 32 
Japan 1.043 12 1.084 24 1.388 34 1.602 34 
Latvia 1.065 23 1.098 26 1.131 24 1.290 26 
Lithuania 1.035 4 1.039 2 1.082 15 1.273 25 
Luxembourg 1.041 11 1.052 9 1.081 13 1.116 10 
Netherlands 1.039 10 1.052 8 1.077 12 1.072 3 
Norway 1.092 28 1.049 6 1.065 5 1.135 20 
Peru 1.051 16 1.065 17 1.083 16 1.123 13 
Poland 1.085 27 1.166 28 1.130 23 1.185 22 
Portugal 1.038 8 1.087 25 1.266 32 1.336 29 
Slovak Republic 1.052 19 1.065 20 1.085 20 1.124 18 
Slovenia 1.071 25 1.143 27 1.186 25 1.169 21 
South Africa 1.052 21 1.070 22 1.252 31 1.589 33 
Spain 1.354 34 1.406 34 1.373 33 1.414 30 
Sweden 1.033 3 1.042 5 1.065 6 1.075 4 
Switzerland 1.036 6 1.058 13 1.075 10 1.111 9 
United Kingdom 1.192 32 1.217 32 1.210 27 1.262 24 
United States 1.201 33 1.206 31 1.193 26 1.435 31 
Average 1.086  1.109  1.142  1.222  
Note: Output-oriented variable returns to scale (VRS) technical efficiency. Efficiency score: = 1 represents 
maximum efficiency and > 1 means greater inefficiency. All results are based on one output (relative 
redistribution) and four inputs (transfers and direct taxes at CG level and at SNG level). Estimation method: 
DEA bootstrap with 10,000 repetition. 
Source: Own estimations.  
 
In general, we observe that the efficiency scores using absolute and relative 
redistribution outputs show different outcomes. Specifically, the efficiency scores 
employing the absolute redistribution measure as an output depict more countries’ 
inefficiencies than the efficiency scores using the relative redistribution measure as an 
output (see Figure A.2 of Appendix). 
Here, we identify that there are possibilities in most of the countries to increase 
redistributive efficiency. Our findings are in line with previous analyses that report low 
efficiency in Southern European countries, high efficiency in Nordic countries and no 
clear pattern in Anglo-Saxon countries (Afonso et al. 2010b; Kyriacou et al. 2018). 
Developing countries, surprisingly, do not show the worst redistributive performance 
although they display high inefficiency, which may indicate that efficiency does not only 
concern the amount of government resources available. In this sense, to the existing 
empirical literature, we add new findings in this first stage of the analysis (i.e., including 
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fiscal decentralisation) and our results may be used to explain the many differences with 
previous empirical studies (e.g., Kyriacou et al. 2018). 
Besides, we visually inspect the countries to identify a potential pattern or 
relationship between efficiency scores and fiscal decentralisation over 2000-2016 (see 
Figure 4). From it, panel (a) and panel (b) show the link between fiscal decentralisation 
and efficiency scores of absolute and relative redistribution outputs, respectively. The y-
axis represents the direct taxes decentralisation and x-axis represents the transfers 
decentralisation, measuring the share of direct taxes and transfers of the SNGs as 
proportion of total direct taxes and transfers of the GG, respectively. Dots represents the 
countries’ efficiency scores and colour their ranking (green=high-efficiency; 
yellow=medium-efficiency; red=low-efficiency). From the visual exploration, we do not 
observe a clear cluster of countries (dots are relatively well distributed) and thus we 
conclude that fiscal decentralisation may not be able to explain differences in 
redistributive efficiency across countries in this first stage of the analysis (see, for 
instance, Belgium -BEL- and Italy -ITA-). 
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Figure 4 – Efficiency scores and fiscal decentralisation 
(mean period 2000-2016) 
 
Panel (a): Output absolute redistribution 
 
 
Panel (b): Output relative redistribution 
 
Note: The variable-axis represents the decentralisation variable, measuring the share of the variable of the 
SNG as proportion of total variable of the GG. Dot represents the country’ efficiency score and its colour 
represents the level of efficiency which involves green=high, yellow=medium and red=low, which is based 
on the country rankings considering as thresholds the percentiles 33% and 66% of a normal distribution. 
The country code and description are detailed in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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6.2. Second-stage results 
 
Table 3 summarises the main findings arising from Equation 7; we regress the 
redistributive efficiency, i.e., efficiency scores, obtained in the first stage of the analysis, 
on a set of non-discretionary explanatory factors by using a bootstrap truncated regression 
model. The first regression (Model 1) and second regression (Model 2) report the cases 
of estimate the efficiency scores employing the absolute and relative redistribution 
outputs, respectively. 
We find that federal countries tend to be less redistributively efficient than unitary 
countries –the coefficient of “federalism” variable shows a negative sign in both models, 
but it is only significant at the 1% in Model 2. The impact of “federalism” is relevant 
when the redistributive measure takes into account initial inequality conditions; 
ultimately, it is the relevant measure because reflect the redistribution effort. This result 
is not contrary to the normative “decentralisation theorem” of Oates since redistribution 
should be a central government issue. Additionally, Gerring and Thacker (2004) find that 
“federalism” is linked with more political corruption, which may explain our result of the 
weakness of the fiscal policy on redistribution; this is also in line with Oates (2005) and 
Treisman (2000). Moreover, “federalism” is characterised such as the presence of 
multiple veto points in the political process, that may affect negatively redistributive 
efficiency because obstructing the fiscal policy decision-making process; this is in line 
with Kyriacou et al. (2018).   
For both models (1 and 2), we found that the log of per capita GDP does not display 
a significant effect on redistributive efficiency and thus, contrary to what we expected, 
our evidence shows that wealthier countries do not necessarily report a higher level of 
redistributive efficiency. In addition, we control for population 65 years and above and 
unemployment rate, but do not have a significant impact on redistributive efficiency. For 
elderly population, one possible reason is due to having on average lower but less unequal 
income than the working population, who may not be the focus of the redistributive fiscal 
policies. In the case of unemployment rate, it may not explain redistributive efficiency 
because benefits, such as unemployment subsidies, are conditional on past contributions 
and are earnings-related in most countries (Joumard et al. 2013). 
Moreover, we account for a significant positive impact of government effectiveness 
on redistributive efficiency for Model 2 (coefficient in Model 1 is not significant but 
presents the expected sign). Based on previous findings (Gupta et al. 2002; Afonso et al. 
2010b), we interpret and explain this result based on the idea that “better” government 
quality improves the design of the fiscal policy and its credibility as well as reducing the 
levels of corruption, which might foster redistributive efficiency.  
Contrary to what one would expect, we find an insignificant impact of ethnic 
fractionalisation on redistributive efficiency in both models. Given that developed 
countries are less ethnically divided than developing countries and our sample of 
countries cover mainly developed countries, this probably can explain this outcome.  
Furthermore, we find that more education inequality reduces the redistributive 
efficiency, being only significant at the 5% level in the case of Model 2. Inequality in 
education has been decreasing in the last period but inequality remains high (Castelló-
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Climent and Doménech 2014). Possibly, more educated people increase pressure on 
monitoring activities of politicians and bureaucrats to be more efficient and also increase 
social demands to reduce inequality (Afonso et al. 2010b).  
The democratic accountability variable directly affects redistributive efficiency of 
fiscal policy, significant at the 1% level in Model 1 and at 10% in Model 2. One possible 
interpretation is because accountability gives voters some control over politicians, such 
as to punish them at re-election, which directly strengthens the politicians’ incentives for 
good behaviour (Persson and Tabellini 2004). In addition, the highest democratic 
accountability refers to alternating democracies regimes that are characterised as a 
government that switches (e.g., after two successive terms) and also has the presence of 
more than on political party, which can lead to an overall effectiveness of fiscal policies.    
Moreover, debt fiscal rules positively affect redistributive efficiency and thus it is 
in line with the notion that it drives an efficient use of resources (only significant at the 
5% level in Model 1).  
The dummy geographical region control variables are positive and most of them 
significant at an at least 5% level, suggesting that all reporting regions are more 
redistributive efficient than the omitted region, namely Southern Europe. Thus, time-
invariant characteristics of these regions are detrimental in explaining efficiency scores, 
such as the geographical position, the climate, the cultural background, etc. Contrary to 
Kyriacou et al. (2018), we control by geographical region instead of welfare states 
variable in the regression analysis; here, we believe that our outcomes constitute an 
improvement because the generosity of the welfare state is discretionary fiscal policy and 
thus we capture it in the first stage of the DEA analysis (as input). 
In sum, our empirical findings reveal that redistributive efficiency of the fiscal 
policy vary across countries and over time, and it is directly associated with having a non-
federal (or unitary) political system (i.e., low political decentralisation), high government 
effectiveness and democratic accountability, low education inequality as well as the 
existence of debt fiscal rules. 
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Table 3 – Determinants of redistributive efficiency of fiscal policy 
Dependent variable 
 Model 1 
Efficiency score of output 
 absolute redistribution 
 Model 2 
Efficiency score of output 
 relative redistribution 
Explanatory variable 
 
Coefficient 
95% Confidence 
interval 
 
Coefficient 
95% Confidence 
interval 
 lb ub  lb ub 
Federalism  -0.014 
(0.017) 
-0.047 0.018  -0.050*** 
(0.017) 
-0.017 -0.084 
Log of per capita GDP  -0.038 
(0.064) 
-0.164 0.084  -0.044 
(0.062) 
-0.165 0.077 
Elderly people (% of total 
population) 
 0.000 
(0.013) 
-0.027 0.026  0.004 
(0.013) 
-0.021 0.030 
Unemployment rate  0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.007 -0.010  -0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.014 0.004 
Government effectiveness  0.054 
(0.082) 
-0.106 0.215  0.144** 
(0.073) 
0.000 0.288 
Ethnic fractionalisation  0.171 
(0.123) 
-0.069 0.412  0.064 
(0.108) 
-0.147 0.275 
Education inequality  -0.014 
(0.375) 
-0.750 0.722  -0.952** 
(0.403) 
-1.743 -0.161 
Democratic accountability  0.179*** 
(0.064) 
0.053 0.305  0.141* 
(0.073) 
-0.003 0.284 
Debt fiscal rules  0.125** 
(0.057) 
-0.013 0.238  0.022 
(0.047) 
-0.070 0.114 
Constant  -2.023** 
(0.830) 
-3.631 0.415  -1.318* 
(0.792) 
-2.810 0.175 
Region fixed effects:         
          EE  0.366*** 
(0.113) 
0.144 0.588  0.186** 
(0.094) 
0.002 0.369 
          WE  0.317*** 
(0.102) 
0.117 0.518  0.253*** 
(0.092) 
0.073 0.433 
          NE  0.336*** 
(0.101) 
0.139 0.534  0.125 
(0.078) 
-0.027 0.277 
          DC  0.653** 
(0.281) 
0.12 1.204  0.547** 
(0.258) 
0.040 1.053 
          ODC  0.206** 
(0.099) 
0.012 0.238  -0.023 
(0.101) 
-0.220 0.175 
Period fixed effects  Yes    Yes   
Wald chi2  52.28    56.16   
Log likelihood  158.843    184.656   
Observations  140    140   
Notes: The dependent variable is the bias-corrected efficiency scores derived from the bootstrap-DEA 
method (1,000 repetition). Bootstrapping standard errors are presented in parentheses. Low boundary -lb- 
and upper boundary -ub-. Level of significance: 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). 
Source: Own estimations. 
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6.3. Sensitivity analysis 
 
In this subsection, we propose some robustness tests. Our analysis concerns assessment 
of the impact of using an alternative measure of “federalism” (the Regional Authority 
Index) and introducing additional variables (party orientation, control of corruption -as 
an alternative measure of government effectiveness- and presidential system) on 
redistributive efficiency in our baseline models 1 and 2 of Table 3 (in columns 1 and 2 of 
Table 4 respectively). Besides, we report in Table A.5 of Appendix the sensitivity of our 
bootstrap estimations of the baseline models, generating robust and clustered standard 
error estimations. In particular, robust standard errors allow to control for some kinds of 
misspecification and clustered standard errors, at the region level, allow to control for 
intragroup correlations. We find that “federalism” remains robust to different variance 
estimators. Apart from that, we do not find substantial differences in the significance of 
the other outcomes.  
First of all, we employ an alternative measure of “federalism”, the Regional 
Authority Index (RAI) from Hooghe et al. (2016) –they have a high positive correlation 
of 0.75. The authors built an overall indicator of “regional authority” as the sum of “self-
rule” (five dimensions: institutional depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy, borrowing 
autonomy, representation) and “shared-rule” (five dimensions: law making, executive 
control, fiscal control, borrowing control and constitutional reform). Higher points are 
given to countries that enjoy a high degree of authority by regional government. Data are 
available for most of our sample of countries (excluding South Africa). In columns 3 and 
4 of Table 4 we present the results when considering the RAI variable. We find that 
“regional authority” is negatively associated with redistributive efficiency. Therefore, our 
analysis report robust empirical evidence that federal countries tend to be less 
redistributive efficient.  
One of the most typical and relevant questions is whether the partisan orientation 
of governments affects redistribution, and commonly the expectation is that left-wing 
party orientation can be expected to favour social benefits policies to low- and medium- 
income groups (Mahler and Jesuit 2006). Indeed, Bradley et al. (2003) find that leftist 
government has a direct positive impact on redistribution while right-wing government 
tends to affect it negatively. They also point out that leftist government is highly 
correlated with union density and bargaining centralization, consequently, we do not 
consider these variables in the analysis. To check whether party orientation determines 
redistributive efficiency, we introduce the control variable “party orientation” concerning 
economic policy (right, centre and left) from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI). 
The estimate results are present in Table 4, models 5 and 6. We find that the party 
orientation does not affect redistributive efficiency and our main results do not change; 
additionally, our findings are complementary to Bradley et al. (2003) given that we focus 
on efficiency. 
Moreover, Gupta et al. (2002) find that high levels of corruption lead to increased 
inequality in market income. Corruption involves the manipulation of public policies for 
private gain by the governing authorities. The authors argue that one possible channel 
operates by affecting redistribution programs of poor-income groups, such as siphoning 
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off or redirecting social transfers funds to benefits well-connected wealthy groups. 
Afonso et al. (2010b) argue that “good” quality of institutions (e.g., rule of law) is 
associated with less corruption, diminishing income inequality. In this context, we are 
interested in examining how corruption affects redistributive efficiency of fiscal policy. 
To do this, we introduce the variable “control of corruption” from the ICRG; the highest 
value of the variable represents least corruption and the lowest value represents more 
corruption. In addition, we exclude “government effectiveness” to estimates the base 
models given that both variables are high linked (correlation of 0.86); we would expect 
our corruption variable to directly impact redistributive efficiency. Note that the degree 
of corruption reduces the efficiency of politics and business, and also high corruption 
could lead in a fall of the government or restructuring of the country’s political institutions 
(ICRG, 2013a). The estimate results are report in Table 4, models 7 and 8. We find a 
significant positive impact of “control of corruption” on redistributive efficiency, without 
substantially altering coefficients and significance of the rest of the variables. While 
previous studies provide evidence of the effect of corruption on income distribution, we 
present evidence that lower degree of corruption is significant and positively associated 
with more redistributive efficiency. 
Furthermore, Adam et al. (2014) find a direct effect of presidential government on 
public sector efficiency. This is explained based on the fact that elected officials have 
incentives to perform well under presidential regimes because changes in the delegation 
of power are simpler than in parliamentary regimes (Persson and Tabellini 2004). To 
examine the potential effect of the forms of government on redistributive efficiency, we 
include the “presidential system” dummy variable in our baseline models that takes a 
value of 1 when the system of government is presidential regime, and a value of 0 
otherwise (parliamentary or assembly-elected president), data are obtained from the DPI. 
The estimate results are reported in models 9 and 10, which describe an insignificant 
effect of presidential governments on redistributive efficiency. In conclusion, our 
empirical findings are robust in the face of each of these checks. 
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Table 4 – Robustness checks 
Notes: All regression include a constant (not shown). Bootstrap standard errors are presented in parentheses. Level of significance: 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). 
Source: Own estimations. 
Dependent variable – Efficiency score: (a) 
absolute and (b) relative redistribution outputs 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
(a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) 
Federalism -0.014 
(0.017) 
-0.050*** 
(0.017) 
--- --- -0.015 
(0.019) 
-0.056*** 
(0.017) 
-0.014 
(0.016) 
-0.049*** 
(0.017) 
-0.015 
(0.017) 
-0.049*** 
(0.017) 
Regional Authority Index --- 
 
--- 
 
-0.004* 
(0.002) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- 
Log of per capita GDP -0.038 
(0.064) 
-0.044 
(0.062) 
-0.007 
(0.066) 
-0.002 
(0.062) 
-0.035 
(0.065) 
-0.043 
(0.058) 
-0.063 
(0.046) 
-0.056 
(0.043) 
-0.038 
(0.065) 
-0.046 
(0.063) 
Elderly people (% of total population) 0.000 
(0.013) 
0.004 
(0.013) 
0.005 
(0.015) 
0.007 
(0.012) 
0.000 
(0.012) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
-0.002 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.012) 
0.000 
(0.013) 
0.004 
(0.013) 
Unemployment rate 0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.040) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
Government effectiveness 0.054 
(0.082) 
0.144** 
(0.073) 
0.038 
(0.083) 
0.110 
(0.071) 
0.034 
(0.085) 
0.127* 
(0.072) 
--- --- 0.054 
(0.082) 
0.148* 
(0.076) 
Control of corruption --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.063* 
(0.035) 
0.099*** 
(0.029) 
--- --- 
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.171 
(0.123) 
0.064 
(0.108) 
0.230* 
(0.118) 
0.137 
(0.096) 
0.124 
(0.121) 
-0.014 
(0.104) 
0.117 
(0.117) 
0.083 
(0.099) 
0.172 
(0.122) 
0.065 
(0.107) 
Education inequality -0.014 
(0.375) 
-0.952** 
(0.403) 
-0.018 
(0.369) 
-0.833** 
(0.387) 
-0.158 
(0.416) 
-1.261*** 
(0.432) 
0.005 
(0.342) 
-0.925** 
(0.365) 
-0.013 
(0.376) 
-0.942** 
(0.396) 
Democratic accountability 0.179*** 
(0.064) 
0.141* 
(0.073) 
0.201*** 
(0.063) 
0.142** 
(0.064) 
0.187*** 
(0.066) 
0.135** 
(0.066) 
0.140** 
(0.062) 
0.084 
(0.067) 
0.180*** 
(0.064) 
0.133* 
(0.071) 
Debt fiscal rules 0.125** 
(0.057) 
0.022 
(0.047) 
0.142** 
(0.056) 
0.035 
(0.040) 
0.138** 
(0.057) 
0.054 
(0.049) 
0.126** 
(0.054) 
0.026 
(0.044) 
0.126** 
(0.057) 
0.021 
(0.047) 
Party orientation: Right --- --- --- --- -0.037 
(0.075) 
-0.025 
(0.070) 
--- --- --- --- 
                             Centre --- --- --- --- 0.031 
(0.081) 
0.068 
(0.076) 
--- --- --- --- 
                              Left --- --- --- --- 0.010 
(0.074) 
0.008 
(0.070) 
--- --- --- --- 
Presidential system --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.007 
(0.088) 
-0.049 
(0.090) 
Region and period fixed effects: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald chi2 52.28 56.16 56.53 62.21 56.72 64.46 57.50 55.82 52.48 58.95 
Log pseudolikelihood 158.843 184.656 153.410 183.471 155.654 179.644 160.483 188.003 158.85 184.88 
Observations 140 140 136 136 135 135 140 140 140 140 
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7. Conclusions 
 
In this article, we empirically study the redistributive efficiency of fiscal policy 
instruments and their degree of decentralisation -transfers and direct taxes- for a sample 
of thirty-five countries during the 2000-2016 period, using a bootstrap DEA analysis. 
Given that we would expect to find that redistribution efficiency performance differs 
across countries and over time due to the influence of non-discretional or exogenous 
determinants, we also investigate the impact of demographic, economic, political and 
institutional factors on redistributive efficiency, applying bootstrap truncated panel 
regression techniques. 
Our paper contains several contributions and findings. First, we analyse the 
redistributive efficiency of the fiscal policy instruments and their degree of 
decentralisation for a set of thirty-five countries composed of both developed and 
developing countries. Specifically, the study is novel in that it introduces fiscal size and 
their degree of decentralisation to compute efficiency scores and country efficiency 
rankings. Nevertheless, our outcomes indicate that fiscal decentralisation may not affect 
income redistribution efficiency. Second, we deliver new insight into the income 
distribution literature about the redistributive impact of the Great Recession. Contrary to 
the empirical literature on overall public sector efficiency, on average, we find that 
income redistribution inefficiency increasing over time. Thirdly, our analysis 
complements other recent works in this field by using different explanatory factors to 
explain redistributive efficiency variation across countries and over time. In particular, 
we account for federal political system as a proxy of political decentralisation and find 
that it is directly associated with less redistributive efficiency.  
Moreover, the robustness tests include an alternative measure of “federalism”, 
additional explanatory factors (such as party orientation, control of corruption and 
presidential system) and alternatives standard error estimators, and do not substantially 
change our main conclusions.  
Our agenda involves identify the weight of each input to explain its relative 
importance for efficiency score output. Advancement in this direction may contribute to 
a better understanding of the impact of fiscal instruments and decentralisation on 
redistribution efficiency.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1 – List of countries and regions 
Code - Country Code – Country  
Southern Europe (SE) Developing countries (DC) 
GRC – Greece CHL – Chile 
ITA – Italy SLV – El Salvador 
PRT – Portugal PER – Peru 
SVN – Slovenia ZAF – South Africa 
ESP – Spain  
Eastern Europe (EE) (Other) Developed countries (ODC) 
CZE – Czech Republic AUS – Australia 
HUN - Hungary CAN – Canada 
POL – Poland ISR – Israel 
SVK – Slovak Republic JPN – Japan 
 USA – United States 
Western Europe (WE)  
AUT – Austria  
BEL – Belgium   
FRA – France  
DEU – Germany  
LUX – Luxemburg  
NLD – Netherlands  
CHE – Switzerland  
Northern Europe (NE)  
DNK – Denmark  
EST – Estonia   
FIN – Finland  
ISL – Iceland  
IRL – Ireland  
LVA – Latvia  
LTU – Lithuania  
NOR – Norway  
SWE – Sweden  
GBR – United Kingdom  
 Note: The list of geographic regions is from United Nations  
 https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/  
 Source: Own elaboration. 
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Table A.2 – Definition of variables and sources 
Variable Definition Sources 
Federalism Federalism involves 5 categories: 1, non-federal; 2, 
semi-federal (elective regional 
legislatures/constitutional sovereignty at national 
level); 3, federal (elective regional legislatures and 
constitutional recognition of subnational authority); 
add 1 if weak bicameral; add 2 if strong bicameral. 
Total range = 1-5, with higher values indicating 
more federal.  
Gerring and Thacker (2004). 
Frequency data: one 
observation in 1997. 
GDP per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in terms of 
population (constant 2010 U$S).  
World Development 
Indicators (WDI). Frequency 
data: annual. 
Elderly people Population ages 65 years old and above. WDI. Frequency data: 
annual. 
Unemployment 
rate 
Unemployment, total (% of total labour force) 
(modeled ILO estimate). 
WDI. Frequency data: 
annual. 
Ethnic 
fractionalisation 
The probability that two randomly selected 
individuals belong to different ethnical groups, and 
so increase with the number of groups. Complete 
ethnic homogeneity (an index of 0) to complete 
heterogeneity (an index of 1). 
Alesina et al (2003). 
Frequency data: one-year 
observation between 1979 to 
2001.  
Government 
effectiveness 
Describes the quality of public services, the quality 
of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies. Estimate gives the country's score on the 
aggregate indicator, in units of a standard normal 
distribution, i.e., ranging from approximately -2.5 
(lowest) to 2.5 (highest). 
World Governance 
Indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann 
et al. 2011). Frequency data: 
annual (except for 1996–
2002, biannual data basis). 
Education 
inequality 
Gini coefficient for education, average years of 
schooling in the population 25 years old and above. 
Castelló-Climent and 
Doménech (2014). 
Frequency data: five-year, 
from 1950 to 2010. 
Democratic 
accountability 
This is compute based on the type of the governance 
enjoyed by the country. The highest value (6) is 
assigned the lowest potential political risk 
(Alternating Democracies) and the lowest value (0) 
indicating the highest potential political risk 
(Autarchies) –total range = 0-6.  
International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG 2013). 
Frequency: annual data 
(from 1996 to 2002 
biannual data). 
Debt fiscal rules Dummy variable: 1 if there is a debt rule, 0 
otherwise. 
Lledó et al. (2017). 
Frequency: annual data. 
Regional 
authority index 
The sum of “self-rule” and “shared-rule”. See the 
article for full details. 
Regional Authority Index 
(Hooghe et al. 2016). 
Frequency: annual. 
Party orientation Party orientation with respect to economic policy. 
Right: for parties that are defined as conservative, 
Christian democratic, or right-wing. Left: for parties 
that are defined as communist, socialist, social 
democratic, or left-wing. Centre: for parties that are 
defined as centrist or when party position can best be 
described as centric. 
Database of Political 
Institutions (DPI) (Cruz et al. 
2018). Frequency: annual. 
Control of 
corruption 
This is an assessment of the corruption within the 
political system. The highest value (6) is assigned 
the lowest potential political risk (least corruption) 
and the lowest value (0) indicating the highest 
potential political risk (most corruption). 
ICRG. Frequency: annual 
data (from 1996 to 2002 
biannual data). 
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Table A.2 (continuation) – Definition of variables and sources 
Variable Definition Sources 
Presidential 
system 
Dummy variable = 1 if presidential system -
president is elected directly by the people or by an 
electoral college, and also include system with 
unelected executive-, 0 if parliamentary or 
assembly-elected president.  
DPI. Frequency: annual. 
Source: Own elaboration. 
 
 
Table A.3 – Descriptive statistics of input-output variables 
Statistics 
Input  Output 
I1 I2 I3 I4  O1 O2 
2000 - 2004 
Mean 10.180 17.506 1.319 4.443  15.973 33.833 
Std. Dev. 4.279 5.766 1.865 3.913  5.333 11.530 
Min 0.708 5.578 0 0.102  1.360 2.895 
Max 16.884 28.269 10.920 12.972  23.020 48.467 
2005 - 2009 
Mean 10.322 17.693 1.291 4.530  16.177 33.941 
Std. Dev. 4.094 5.284 1.881 3.942  5.400 11.391 
Min 2.188 7.000 0 0.173  2.200 4.909 
Max 17.183 27.090 10.992 13.178  23.720 48.799 
2010 - 2014 
Mean 11.334 17.458 1.412 4.564  16.486 34.257 
Std. Dev. 4.600 5.438 2.101 3.945  5.410 11.133 
Min 1.735 7.725 0 0.228  2.900 6.161 
Max 18.819 27.918 12.289 13.316  23.980 48.386 
2015 - 2016 
Mean 11.083 18.076 1.461 4.771  16.423 34.136 
Std. Dev. 4.671 5.434 2.193 4.173  5.413 11.005 
Min 1.728 8.354 0 0.189  2.850 6.064 
Max 19.534 28.581 12.516 14.106  23.95 47.948 
Note: O1 = absolute redistribution, O2 = relative redistribution, I1 = transfers at CG level, I2 = direct taxes 
at CG level, I3 = transfers at SNG level, I4 = direct taxes at SNG level. Number of countries: 35.  
Source: Own estimations.   
 
Table A.4 – Descriptive statistics of determinant variables 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Federalism 140 2.086 1.386 1 5 
Log of per capita GDP 140 10.239 0.815 7.901 11.584 
Elderly people 140 15.208 4.151 4.160 26.290 
Unemployment rate 140 8.384 5.125 2.962 31.326 
Government effectiveness 140 1.253 0.629 -0.515 2.237 
Ethnic fractionalisation 140 0.269 0.213 0.012 0.752 
Education inequality 140 0.158 0.073 0.026 0.386 
Democratic accountability   140 5.647 0.502 3.992 6 
Regional authority index 136 13.252 10.767 0 37.44 
Control of corruption 140 3.907 1.092 2 6 
Note: The table presents the number of observations and summary statistics of the variables used in the 
second stage analysis (excluding the dummy variables). 
Source: Own estimations. 
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Table A.5 – Truncated regression results by variance estimators 
Estimator of variance  Bootstrap (benchmark model)  Robust  Cluster (at the region level) 
Dependent variable: 
Efficiency score 
 Output absolute 
redistribution 
(1) 
 Output relative 
redistribution 
(2) 
 Output absolute 
redistribution 
(3) 
 Output relative 
redistribution 
(4) 
 Output absolute 
redistribution 
(5) 
 Output relative 
redistribution 
(6) 
Federalism  -0.014 
(0.017) 
 -0.050*** 
(0.017) 
 -0.014 
(0.015) 
 -0.050*** 
(0.015) 
 -0.014 
(0.027) 
 -0.050** 
(0.023) 
Log of per capita GDP  -0.038 
(0.064) 
 -0.044 
(0.062) 
 -0.038 
(0.056) 
 -0.044 
(0.052) 
 -0.038 
(0.066) 
 -0.044 
(0.070) 
Elderly people (% of 
total population) 
 0.000 
(0.013) 
 0.004 
(0.013) 
 0.000 
(0.013) 
 0.004 
(0.012) 
 0.000 
(0.008) 
 0.004 
(0.008) 
Unemployment rate  0.002 
(0.004) 
 -0.005 
(0.005) 
 0.002 
(0.004) 
 -0.005 
(0.004) 
 0.002 
(0.004) 
 -0.005 
(0.006) 
Government 
effectiveness 
 0.054 
(0.082) 
 0.144** 
(0.073) 
 0.054 
(0.077) 
 0.144** 
(0.067) 
 0.054** 
(0.023) 
 0.144*** 
(0.038) 
Ethnic fractionalisation  0.171 
(0.123) 
 0.064 
(0.108) 
 0.171 
(0.117) 
 0.064 
(0.097) 
 0.171 
(0.215) 
 0.064 
(0.181) 
Education inequality  -0.014 
(0.375) 
 -0.952** 
(0.403) 
 -0.014 
(0.328) 
 -0.952** 
(0.403) 
 -0.014 
(0.305) 
 -0.952* 
(0.487) 
Democratic 
accountability 
 0.179*** 
(0.064) 
 0.141* 
(0.073) 
 0.179*** 
(0.060) 
 0.141** 
(0.070) 
 0.179** 
(0.073) 
 0.141** 
(0.064) 
Debt fiscal rules  0.125** 
(0.057) 
 0.022 
(0.047) 
 0.125** 
(0.057) 
 0.022 
(0.043) 
 0.125 
(0.079) 
 0.022 
(0.088) 
Region fixed effects:  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Period fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Wald chi2  52.28  56.16  64.50  72.84  ---  --- 
Log pseudolikelihood  158.843  184.656  158.843  184.656  158.843  184.656 
Observations  140  140  140  140  140  140 
Notes: All regression include a constant (not shown). Standard errors are presented in parentheses. Level of significance: 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***).  
Source: Own estimations.
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Figure A.1 – Fiscal decentralisation 
(mean period 2000-2016) 
 
Note: Excluding Denmark (decentralisation of transfers = 0.7 and direct taxes = 0.28) for reasons of clear 
plot representation. The country code and description are detailed in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from IMF Fiscal Decentralisation dataset. 
 
 
Figure A.2 – Efficiency scores of absolute and relative redistribution outputs 
(mean period 2000-2016) 
 
Note: Efficiency score: = 1 represents maximum efficiency and > 1 means greater inefficiency. The solid 
line represents the 45-degree line and the dash line represents the average of the axis variable. The country 
code and description are detailed in Table A.1 in the Appendix. 
Source: Own estimations. 
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